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Do-gooder derogation in children:
the social costs of generosity
Arber Tasimi*, Amy Dominguez and Karen Wynn
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Generosity is greatly valued and admired, but can it sometimes be unappealing? The
current study investigated 8- to 10-year-old children’s (N = 128) preference for generous
individuals, and the effects of social comparison on their preferences. In Experiment
1, children showed a strong preference for a generous to a stingy child; however, this
preference was significantly reduced in a situation that afforded children a comparison
of their own (lesser) generosity to that of another child. In Experiment 2, children’s liking
for a generous individual was not reduced when that individual was an adult, suggesting
that similarity in age influences whether a child engages in social comparison. These
findings indicate that, by middle childhood, coming up short in comparison with a peer
can decrease one’s liking for a generous individual.
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Introduction
From the first few months of life, humans are attracted to those who behave kindly toward others
(Hamlin et al., 2007, 2010; Hamlin and Wynn, 2011). Before their second birthday, young toddlers
will even reward individuals for their positive behaviors (Hamlin et al., 2011). Such an attraction
toward prosocial individuals is robust across development. For example, young children help
individuals who engage in positive behaviors more than those who engage in negative ones (Vaish
et al., 2010). In adolescence, individuals who behave prosocially are more likely to be accepted into
peer groups (Parkhurst and Asher, 1992). Among adults, prosocial individuals hold a high social
status and are sought as interaction partners (Hardy and Van Vugt, 2006). Beyond the laboratory
as well, everyday life abounds with examples of positive behaviors being lauded, from elementary
schools that award students certificates when they are “caught being good” to news reports that praise
philanthropists for their charitable work.
Despite this strong favoritism toward benevolent others, a number of recent studies suggest that
acting too generously can sometimes be off-putting, a phenomenon often referred to as “do-gooder
derogation.” For example, recent work finds that in some contexts adults dislike the extremely
generous: When evaluating players who contributed various amounts to a group effort, adults
expelled over-contributing individuals as much as under-contributing ones (Parks and Stone, 2010).
Dislike of do-gooders is not unusual; some evidence suggests that it may be universal (Herrmann
et al., 2008). In particular, in a public goods game, where participants choose how much to
donate to a public pot (of which the total is then multiplied, and subsequently divided equally
among players), individuals from a range of cultures punished high contributors as much as low
contributors.
What could explain this aversion to generous individuals? People may resent others’ generosity
for reasons involving social comparison (Monin, 2007). In particular, people are more likely
to reject those who do the right thing in situations that evoke social comparisons with others
(Monin et al., 2008). For example, participants who took part in a task perceived as racist
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(e.g., asked to identify the likely burglar in a suspect lineup
after being given information that pointed to the lone African
American in the lineup) subsequently rejected an individual who
refused to go along because the task was “offensive,” whereas
mere observers embraced him. A popular example of this aversion
also comes from meat eaters who use negative words to describe
vegetarians because they believe that vegetarians feel morally
superior (Minson andMonin, 2011). In fact, people asked to taste
meat are more likely to dislike an individual who refuses to do
so, if that refusal is for moral rather than non-moral reasons
(Cramwinckel et al., 2013). These findings show that adults often
tend to feel negatively toward individuals who morally outshine
them.
Indeed, previous theorizing suggests that the tendency to
engage in social comparison is a fundamental aspect of everyday
social life (Festinger, 1954; Fiske, 2011). A growing body of
research has shown that comparing oneself to others is an early-
emerging dimension of social cognition (e.g., Ruble et al., 1994;
Pomerantz et al., 1995; Rhodes and Brickman, 2008). For example,
5- and 6-year-olds willingly incur a personal cost to ensure that
they receive more resources than another child (Sheskin et al.,
2014). Moreover, 7- to 13-year-olds feel more bitter upon failing
a speeded reaction time task after learning that another child
succeeded (Steinbeis and Singer, 2013). Although this literature
has demonstrated that childhood is a period rife with social
comparisons (for review, see Dijkstra et al., 2008), very little is
known about whether children are affected by another’s generous
behavior relative to their own.
The current study examined whether children reject
individuals whom they see as more generous than themselves.
Generosity is considered one of the most important spiritual
values in the Bible (Corinthians 1:13), and it is admired
universally, and from very early in life; for example, even young
infants prefer an individual that gives rather than takes (Hamlin
and Wynn, 2011). Thus, understanding whether children reject
individuals on the basis of their generosity provides a strong
test of the role of social comparison in do-gooder derogation,
especially because previous work on this topic has focused on
ambiguously “moral” domains such as vegetarianism (Minson
and Monin, 2011; Cramwinckel et al., 2013) and “political
correctness” (Monin et al., 2008).
We focused on children aged 8–10 to investigate whether
appearing selfish relative to another individual influences their
social preferences. From the ages of 7–8 onwards, children select
equitable resource distributions between themselves and another
child, while younger children select distributions that favor
themselves (Fehr et al., 2008; Sheskin et al., 2014). These results
suggest that, by 7–8 years of age, children are especially concerned
with not being—or not appearing—selfish. In Experiment 1,
we assessed whether children would be less likely to prefer a
generous child who behaves more generously than themselves. In
Experiment 2, we ran a stronger test of our social comparison
hypothesis: because social comparisons are strongest for those
most similar to ourselves (Goethals andDarley, 1977;Wood, 1989;
Suls et al., 2002), we assessed whether children’s liking for a more
generous individual was influenced when that individual was an
adult, rather than another child. This manipulation decreases the
potential for social comparison and, thus, children should reliably
prefer a generous adult, regardless of whether children first give
themselves.
Experiment 1
Participants
Sixty-four children (40 girls; mean age = 9.26 years;
range = 8.40–10.41 years) participated in the study. Two
additional children were excluded due to experimenter error.
Children were recruited from public schools in the greater New
Haven, Connecticut area and tested individually in a quiet room
at their elementary school. Parents of participating children
gave written informed consent; children also provided oral
assent. Data were not gathered on participants’ race/ethnicity;
however, children were tested in schools serving communities
that were primarily white and middle class. The Human Subjects
Committee at Yale University approved all study procedures.
Procedure
Children were given six stickers and randomly assigned to the
Comparison (N = 32) or No Comparison (N = 32) condition. In
the Comparison condition, the experimenter showed children a
photograph of a child, Gary, telling them Gary had no stickers
and asking whether they wanted to give him any of theirs (“I
want to tell you about this kid named Gary. Look, Gary has no
stickers. Would you like to give Gary any of your stickers?”). If the
child responded yes, the experimenter asked how many stickers
they wanted to give and instructed them to put these stickers
in front of Gary’s photo. Children were next shown photos of
two new children (Jeff and Sam), each of whom had six stickers.
One gave five stickers to Gary; the other gave one sticker (e.g.,
“Now I want to tell you about these two other people. This is Jeff.
Jeff has six stickers. Jeff wants to give Gary five of his stickers.
This is Sam. Sam has six stickers. Sam wants to give Gary one
of his stickers.”). Photographs of the three characters were taken
from a database of child faces (LoBue and Thrasher, 2014), and
all participants were shown photos of males. Children were then
asked to select between these two characters—“Who do you want
to be friends with?”—which was adapted from previous work
exploring children’s social preferences based on language (e.g.,
Kinzler et al., 2007).
The procedure for the No Comparison condition was identical,
with one exception: Here, children were not asked if they wanted
to give Gary any of their stickers; instead, children simply
observed the two characters (Jeff and Sam) giving Gary their
respective number of stickers (one and five). In both conditions,
we counterbalanced which character (Jeff or Sam) gave their
stickers first across children. All sessions were audio-recorded.
Results
Giving Question (Given Only to Children in the
Comparison Condition)
Children, on average, gave 2.91 stickers to Gary; every child
gave some stickers, with only two children giving five or more
stickers and only one child giving as few as one sticker. Thus,
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FIGURE 1 | Percentage of children choosing each character in the Comparison and No Comparison conditions in Experiment 1 (A)
and Experiment 2 (B).
the large majority of children (30 of 32) gave fewer stickers to
Gary than the generous character and the same as or more than
the ungenerous character, creating a situation where children’s
own giving compared unfavorably to that of the former and
favorably (or comparably, for one child) to that of the latter.
Further analyses showed that there were no significant differences
in giving between the younger and older halves of our subjects,
t(30) = 1.14, p = 0.26; the mean number of stickers given
by the younger 50% of subjects was 2.75 while the mean
number of stickers given by the older 50% of subjects was 3.06
stickers.
Friend Choice Question (Given to Children in Both
Conditions)
Preliminary analyses revealed no significant differences in choices
between the younger and older halves of our subjects in the
No Comparison condition (Fisher’s exact test, p = 1.00) and the
Comparison condition (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.43). Moreover,
there were no differences in choices between boys and girls in the
No Comparison condition (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.52) and the
Comparison condition (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.70). As a result,
ages and gender were combined for all analyses.
In theNo Comparison condition, children almost unanimously
selected the generous character (30 of 32 children, binomial
probability test, p < 0.001), showing a strong preference for a
generous character over an ungenerous one. For the Comparison
condition, because we were interested specifically in children’s
liking for a generous individual who showed them up, we focused
on those children who gave fewer stickers than the generous
character (30 of 32 children). These subjects also, by and large,
preferred the generous character (22 of 30 children, binomial
probability test, p = 0.016), but this preference was significantly
reduced relative to that shown in the No Comparison condition
(Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.04)1; see Figure 1A. There was
over a fourfold increase in children’s choice of the ungenerous
character from 6% in the No Comparison condition to 26.6%
in the Comparison condition. Thus, a situation that afforded a
comparison of children’s own generosity to that of a generous
child significantly reduced their preference for that child, relative
to their preference for someone who did not show them up.
1A strong test of our hypothesis would be to evaluate whether children’s
choice of the generous child varies as a function of their own level of giving.
Specifically, on our hypothesis, children who gave four or fewer stickers (and
were therefore shown up by the generous child) would be expected to select
the stingy child more frequently than children who gave five or six stickers
(whose giving was equal to or greater than the generous character’s). However,
almost all children (N= 30) gave four or fewer stickers; only two children gave
five or more stickers, so no meaningful analysis can be made between the two
groups (however, for informational purposes, of these two subjects that gave
five stickers, one child chose the generous child and the other chose the stingy
child). The vast majority of our subjects (N = 22) gave exactly three stickers.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org July 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 10363
Tasimi et al. Do-gooder derogation in children
Experiment 2
The results from Experiment 1 suggest that situations that
evoke social comparisons decrease children’s liking for extremely
generous individuals who outshine children’s own generosity. As
a stronger test of our social comparison hypothesis, we examined
whether children would reject an extremely generous adult. This
manipulation decreases the potential for social comparison given
that children most strongly compare themselves with others of
similar age (e.g., Suls et al., 1978; Dijkstra et al., 2008; Tasimi and
Johnson, 2015).
Participants
Sixty-four children (32 girls; mean age = 9.33 years;
range = 8.06–10.42 years) participated in the study. Children
were recruited from public schools in the greater New Haven,
Connecticut area and tested individually in a quiet room at their
elementary school. Parents of participating children gave written
informed consent; children also provided oral assent. Data were
not gathered on participants’ race/ethnicity; however, children
were tested in schools serving communities that were primarily
white and middle class. The Human Subjects Committee at Yale
University approved all study procedures.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with one exception:
Here, we used photos of white male adults (photos taken from
Tottenham et al., 2009) to represent Jeff and Sam. Gary, the
recipient, remained a child. All participants were shown pictures
of male adults to minimize confounds. In particular, if we showed
women to girls and men to boys, this would introduce differences
in gender attitudes and expectations that are beyond the scope of
the current study.
Results
Giving Question (Given Only to Children in the
Comparison Condition)
Children, on average, gave 3.12 stickers to Gary; every child
gave some stickers, with only three children giving five or more
stickers and only two children giving one sticker. Thus, the
large majority of children (29 of 32) gave fewer stickers to Gary
than the generous character and the same as or more than the
ungenerous character, creating a situation where children’s own
giving compared unfavorably to that of the former and favorably
(or comparably, for two children) to that of the latter. Further
analyses showed that there were no significant differences in
giving between the younger and older halves of our subjects,
t(30) = 0, p = 1.00; the mean number of stickers given by the
younger 50% of subjects was 3.12 stickers and the mean number
of stickers given by the older 50% of subjects was 3.12.
Friend Choice Question (Given to Children in Both
Conditions)
Preliminary analyses revealed no significant differences in choices
between the younger and older halves of our subjects in the
No Comparison condition (Fisher’s exact test, p = 1.00) and the
Comparison condition (Fisher’s exact test, p = 1.00). Moreover,
there were no differences in choices between boys and girls in the
No Comparison condition (Fisher’s exact test, p = 1.00) and the
Comparison condition (Fisher’s exact test, p = 1.00). As a result,
ages and gender were combined for all analyses.
In theNo Comparison condition, children almost unanimously
selected the generous character (31 of 32 children, binomial
probability test, p < 0.001), showing a strong preference for a
generous character over an ungenerous one. For the Comparison
condition, we focused again on those children in the Comparison
condition who gave fewer stickers than the generous character (29
of 32 children); these children also showed a strong preference for
the generous character (28 of 29 children, binomial probability
test, p< 0.001). Unlike Experiment 1, children’s social preferences
did not differ in the Comparison and No Comparison conditions
(Fisher’s exact test, p= 1.00); see Figure 1B.
While there was no difference in children’s responses in the No
Comparison condition of Experiments 1 and 2 (Fisher’s exact test,
p = 1.00), their responses in the Comparison condition differed
significantly (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.026). Thus, children’s
rejection of do-gooders in the current investigation seems to occur
when they observe generous acts performed by a child, but not by
an adult.
Discussion
Generosity is one of the heavenly virtues, but our results suggest
that it may be a mixed blessing when another’s giving outshines
one’s own. Although children in the current study reliably
preferred a generous to an ungenerous character, this preference
decreased considerably when children’s own generosity was
inferior to another child’s, but not when it was inferior to that
of an adult. These results provide converging evidence, alongside
recent studies on adults, documenting the phenomenon of do-
gooder derogation. They are also the first (to our knowledge)
to show that by middle childhood, social comparison seems to
modulate children’s general tendency to prefer individuals who
behave generously.
Our findings are also notable because they challenge an
alternative explanation for do-gooder derogation, namely that
exceptional behavior is aversive because it deviates from the
norm.Under this account, any deviation from the norm—whether
it is positive or negative—should lead to negative evaluations.
In support of this explanation, when adult subjects were asked
to provide reasons for expelling extremely generous individuals
from their group, many described their generosity as unusual
(Parks and Stone, 2010). Additionally, people willingly punish
generous individuals, especially when their giving seems atypical
compared to other people that gave (Irwin and Horne, 2012).
The current study design affords a test of this explanation: Since
both characters deviated equally from children’s own level of
giving—the modal amount children gave was three stickers—a
normative account would not predict a strong preference for
the more generous character. Yet, children almost unanimously
preferred the more generous character, a preference that was
attenuated, but not eliminated, when children’s own generosity
was less than that of another child. Future work should
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therefore investigate the development and conditions underwhich
children do, and do not, use social and cultural norms to reject
generous individuals.
While our findings show that situations that evoke social
comparisons decrease children’s liking for a generous child, they
do not tell us why some children preferred a stingy child instead
of a generous one. There are at least three distinct interpretations
for this finding in the context of our study: (1) the selfish child
becomes more attractive; (2) the generous child becomes less
attractive; (3) the selfish child becomes more attractive and the
generous child becomes less attractive. This is an interesting
question that future work could examine through measures
such as preference ratings rather than preference rankings. Also,
such work could also ask children how they feel after learning
about others that gave more or less than themselves. It may
be that a selfish individual becomes more attractive because
they boost a child’s self-esteem, whereas a generous individual
becomes less attractive because they lower a child’s self-esteem.
Moreover, it is important that future work also examines whether
children’s own giving moderates their social preferences. For
example, does a child that gives just one sticker show a stronger
aversion toward an extremely generous individual than a child
that gives four stickers? The current findings cannot speak to
this issue as the vast majority of our subjects gave three stickers;
however, this is a promising avenue for future work that could
be influenced by a number of factors, including the types of
goods being offered (e.g., stickers versus dollars) as well as
the type of behavior in question (e.g., sharing versus helping).
Additionally, it is worth emphasizing that our studies involved
children from largelywhite and educated households, which raises
the question of whether the effect reported here generalizes to
other cultures. Following prior research showing that the degree to
which people punish high contributors varies substantially across
societies (Herrmann et al., 2008), it may be that, in some cultures,
children exalt other children who engage in extraordinary acts
of giving, even when their own giving may seem inferior in
comparison.
Finally, given previous work identifying multiple ways in
which moral behavior is rejected (Monin, 2007), it is critical to
understand influences beyond social comparison that lead to the
rejection of benevolent others. Are we suspicious of extremely
generous behaviors and invoke ulterior motives to explain them?
Dowe anticipatemoral reproach from extremely generous others?
These questions become important and intriguing given our
finding that children’s attraction to generous individuals decreases
when another child shows them up.
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